Fields of sense : a new realist ontology

It is still a widespread assumption that metaphysics and ontology deal with roughly the same questions.

They are supposed to be concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and to give an account of the meaning of `existence’ or `being’ in line with the broadest possible metaphysical assumptions.

Against this, Markus Gabriel proposes a radical form of ontological pluralism that divorces ontology from metaphysics, understood as the most fundamental theory of absolutely everything (the world).

He argues that the concept of existence is incompatible with the existence of the world and therefore proposes his innovative no-world-view.

In the context of recent debates surrounding new realism and speculative realism, Gabriel also develops the outlines of a realist epistemological pluralism.

His idea here is that there are different forms of knowledge that correspond to the plurality of fields of sense that must be acknowledged in order to avoid the trap of metaphysics.