Coalitions Presidents Make: Presidential Power and Its Limits in Democratic Indonesia

In The Coalitions Presidents Make, Marcus Mietzner explains how Indonesia has turned its volatile post-authoritarian presidential system into one of the world's most stable.

He argues that since 2004, Indonesian presidents have deployed nuanced strategies of coalition building to consolidate their authority and these coalitions are responsible for the regime stability in place today.

In building coalitions, Indonesian presidents have looked beyond parties and parliament-the traditional partners of presidents in most other countries.

In Indonesia, actors such as the military, the police, the bureaucracy, local governments, oligarchs, and Muslim groups are integrated into presidential coalitions by giving them the same status as parties and parliament.

But while this inclusiveness has made Indonesia's presidential system extraordinarily durable, it has also caused democratic decline.

In order to secure the stability of their coalitions, presidents must observe the vested interests of each member when making policy decisions.

The Coalitions Presidents Make details the process through which presidents balance their own powers and interests with those of their partners, encouraging patronage-oriented collaboration and disincentivizing confrontation.