On the Phenomenal, Intentional and Material Nature of Mind

Consciousness, particularly human consciousness and its phenomenal properties, has become, in recent years, one of the central points of controversy in the philosophy of mind along with intentionality. Some philosophers (Rorty, 1979) have argued that both properties - consciousness and intentionality - are totally independent. Others philosophers (Tye, 1995; Dretske, 1995) emphasise that consciousness can be explained in terms of representational or intentional content, and this is the way to naturalize consciousness via a naturalized project of intentionality. However, recently (Kriegel, 2013) there has been a new research approach called phenomenal intentionality.1 Under this view the source of intentionality is the phenomenal character of experience, in other words, intentionality depends primarily upon consciousness. It is this view that forms my starting point, and that I attempt to defend.