Handbook of central banking, financial regulation and supervision : after the financial crisis

This stimulating and original Handbook offers an updated and systematic discussion of the relationship between central banks, financial regulation and supervision after the global financial crisis.

The crisis has raised new questions about the compatibility of monetary and financial stability, which are changing the face of central banking and its relationships with the architecture of financial regulation and supervision.

The Handbook explores on both the economics and political economy of the topic, in order to understand how and why reforms of the role of the central banks can be designed and implemented.

The general suggestion is that future effectiveness of the central banking architecture will depend on its ability to ensure the consistency between the monetary actions in normal and extraordinary times.

Consequently the possible paths in the central bank strategies and tactics, as well as in the classic concepts of independence, accountability and transparency, are analyzed and discussed.

With chapters written by outstanding scholars in economics, this lucid Handbook will appeal to academics, policy makers and practitioners, ranging from central bankers and supervisory authorities to financial operators.

Among the academics it would be of particular interest to financial and monetary economists (including postgraduate students), but the institutional slant and the central theme of relations between economics, institutional settings and politics will also be invaluable for political scientists. Contributors: F. Amtenbrink, J. Baxa, B. Born, P.C. Boyer, G. Caprio, M. Cihák, A. Cukierman, L. Dalla Pellegrina, J. De Haan, M. Ehrmann, B. Eichengreen, S. Eijffinger, Y. Fang, M. Fratzscher, F. Giavazzi, A. Giovannini, C.A.E. Goodhart, I. Hasan, R. Horváth, D. Masciandaro, L.J. Mester, M.J. Nieto, R. Nijskens, A. Orphanides, J. Ponce, M. Quintyn, M. Rezende, P.L. Siklos, A. Tieman, B. Vasícek, R. Vega Pansini