'A further and devastating indictment not only of Tony Blair personally but of a whole apparatus of state and government, Cabinet, Parliament, armed forces, and, far from least, intelligence agencies. — GEOFFREY WHEATCROFT, THE NEW YORK REVIEW OF BOOKS'It offers a long and painful account of an episode that may come to be seen as marking the moment when the UK fell off its global perch, trust in government collapsed and the country turned inward and began to disintegrate.'— PHILIPPE SANDS, LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKSDescriptionAll the key findings of the public inquiry into the handling of the 2003 Iraq war by Tony Blair's government in a 60,000-word book. Chaired by Sir John Chilcot, the Iraq Inquiry (known as the 'Chilcot Report') tackled:Saddam Hussein's threat to Britainthe legal advice for the invasionintelligence about weapons of mass destruction andplanning for a post-conflict Iraq. The behaviour of the GCHQ whistleblower Katharine Gun and the controversy over whether Iraq had weapons of mass destruction was the subject of the film Official Secrets. ContentsIntroductionPre-conflict strategy and planningThe UK decision to support US military action. UK policy before 9/11; The impact of 9/11; Decision to take the UN route; Negotiation of resolution 1441; The prospect of military action; The gap between the Permanent Members of the Security Council widens; The end of the UN routeWhy Iraq?
Why now? Was Iraq a serious or imminent threat?; The predicted increase in the threat to the UK as a result of military action in IraqThe UK’s relationship with the USDecision-making. Collective responsibilityAdvice on the legal basis for military action. The timing of Lord Goldsmith’s advice on the interpretation of resolution 1441; Goldsmith’s advice of 7 March 2003; Goldsmith’s arrival at a “better viewâ€; The exchange of letters on 14 and 15 March 2003; Goldsmith’s Written Answer of 17 March 2003Weapons of mass destruction. Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; The search for WMDPlanning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq. The failure to plan or prepare for known risks; The planning process and decision-makingOccupation.
Looting in Basra; Looting in Baghdad; UK influence on post-invasion strategy: resolution 1483; UK influence on the Coalition Provisional Authority; A decline in security; The turning pointTransition. UK influence on US strategy post-CPA; Planning for withdrawal; The impact of Afghanistan; IraqiisationPreparation for withdrawal.
A major divergence in strategy; A possible civil war; Force Level Review; The beginning of the endDid the UK achieve its objectives in Iraq?Key Findings 1.
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January 2002; Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 – “axis of evil†to Crawford; Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002Key Findings 2.
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January 2003; Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003; Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002; Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003; WMD searchKey Findings 3.
Advice on the legal basis for military action, November 2002 to March 2003; Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq; Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003; Military equipment (pre-conflict); Planning for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq; InvasionKey Findings 4.
The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba’athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnel; Service Personnel; Civilian casualtiesLessons. The decision to go to war; Weapons of mass destruction; The invasion of Iraq; The post-conflict period; Reconstruction; De-Ba’athification; Security Sector Reform; Resources; Military equipment (post-conflict); Civilian personnelÂ
