The criminal law's person

The state’s use of the threat, and imposition, of punishments to regulate conduct is thought (or at least said) by many to be legitimised by the idea that the criminal law’s burdens only fall on those who are blameworthy for their conduct.

However, the formal concept of ‘blameworthiness’ needs to be made substantive.

This puts various ideas regarding the criminal law’s person at the heart of debates about blame, guilt, and responsibility.

How is the criminal law’s person constructed, by whom, and with what disciplinary norms?

How is it threatened by new ‘knowledge’, and how do those threats play out amongst the various stakeholders who claim the criminal law’s person as ‘theirs’?

To address these and cognate questions, this volume brings together an international group of academics to engage with the criminal law’s person from a range of disciplinary perspectives.