Micro-Scale Ehd Conduction-Driven Pumping and Heat Transfer Enhancement in Single-And Two-Phase Systems

Increasing global economic integration has created governance problems of global proportions.

The need for global governance presents a puzzle for state theory and the literature on 'globalization': who has the authority to make global rules?

Who has the ability to make rules, have them accepted as legitimate, and have them obeyed by other actors in the global economy?

I explore these questions through a case study of negotiations over contract rules and quality standards for the global cotton trade.

I challenge existing work on economic governance that has reified the state as the central bearer of legitimate authority.

I argue for a more flexible theory of state-capital relations that captures how authority relations among states and firms have been constructed historically and are being reconstructed to govern global economic networks.

I make four arguments. First, I argue that the shift to liberalized trade in apparel and the accession of China to the World Trade Organization consolidated the power of three actors vying for institutional power in the global cotton trade: the U.S. state, the Chinese state and transnational merchants.

This shift created polyarchy---or the inability of any one actor to impose his/her rules---and shifted the focus of struggle from the plays of the game to the rules of the game.

My second argument is that struggles over new global rules sparked conflict over the legitimate bases of claims to global authority.

Actors launched efforts to construct new legitimate grounds for global authority based less on territory and nation and more on 'neutral' discourses of science and ethics and representation of a 'global public'.

Third, I suggest that struggles to construct legitimate global rules recombined state and private authority in new ways.

We see the growing role of transnational firms as both rule-makers and rule-enforcers, while certain state agencies constructed denationalized modes of operating in order to extend their own rule-making authority globally.

Finally, I argue that polyarchy created strategic opportunities for weaker actors to claim institutional power in the short term.

Overall, however, powerful actors consolidated power through their ability to construct novel state-capital relationships with legitimate authority.