Lockerbie : the inside story

The explosion of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988, should never have happened.

Wallis, who has extensive, direct, personal knowledge of aviation security matters gained from his position at the crossroads of security information and the industry's endeavours to combat aviation terrorism, had warned the industry one year before the bombing that the interline element of bagagge represented the prime opportunity for terrorist activity and had urged the adoption of passenger and baggage matching, a system that he had helped to develop.

Mandated by the FAA for use at high risk airports, it was the feature missing from Pan Am's acitivty at Frankfurt, an omission so cruelly exploited by the bombers.

Wallis argues that the priority given by governments to technological solutions to the continuing terrorist threat puts the flying public at unnecessary risk every day.

This volume brings together all of the facts surrounding the sabotage of Flight 103, including the investigation and the civil litigation in which so much of the story unfolded for the first time. It uncovers the fundamental weaknesses in Pan Am's communication and management policies which created an environment in which good security was never possible.

Wallis supports the policy that "politics are politics" and explores the possibility that US and UK policy towards a "neutral" trial for the two Libyans indicted for the bombing, which can be described as lukewarm throughout the 1990s, may have been affected by the wider scenario of Middle East politics rather than simple justice for the victims of Lockerbie.

Although the tragedy has led to improvements in defence technology for use against acts of aviation sabotage, these methods have yet to be applied universally.