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Preference and information

Egonsson, Dr DanFriggieri, Professor Joseph(Series edited by)Gatens, Professor Moira(Series edited by)Glendinning, Dr Simon(Series edited by)Goldman, Professor Alan(Series edited by)Helm, Professor Paul(Series edited by)Lamb, Professor David(Series edited by)Lipton, Professor Peter(Series edited by)Musgrave, Professor Alan(Series edited by)Oates, Moore(Series edited by)Post, Professor John(Series edited by)Priest, Professor Graham(Series edited by)Sayers, Professor Sean(Series edited by)Singh, Professor Ravindra Raj(Series edited by)
Part of the Ashgate new critical thinking in philosophy series
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Is it important to our quality of life that the preferences we satisfy are rational and well-informed?

Standard preferentialist theories allege that a person's preferences and their satisfaction are the correct measure of well-being.

In preference-sensitive theories, preferences are important but do not count for everything.

This raises the question of whether we ought to make demands on these preferences.

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Product Details
Ashgate
0754684539 / 9780754684534
Ebook
171.2
01/11/2007
England
English
163 pages