Self-evaluation: affective and social grounds of intentionality - 116

The book contains contributions by leading figures in philosophy of mind and action, emotion theory, and phenomenology.

As the focus of the volume is truly innovative we expect the book to sell well to both philosophers and scholars from neighboring fields such as social and cognitive science.

The predominant view in analytic philosophy is that an ability for self-evaluation is constitutive for agency and intentionality.

Until now, the debate is limited in two (possibly mutually related) ways: Firstly, self-evaluation is usually discussed in individual terms, and, as such, not sufficiently related to its social dimensions; secondly, self-evaluation is viewed as a matter of belief and desire, neglecting its affective and emotional aspects.

The aim of the book is to fill these research lacunas and to investigate the question of how these two shortcomings of the received views are related.