Refighting the Last War : Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-53

This book examines the Korean War, the paradigm of America's conflicts with communism.

He argues that, like so many wars, the Korean War was fought broadly along the lines of the war before, World War II.

It shows, however, that the consequences of this error were limited by the State Department.

The book examines the roles, leadership, personalities and prejudices of five key commanders - President Harry S.

Truman, General Douglas MacArthur, General Matthew B.

Ridgway, General Mark W. Clark and Admiral C. Turner Joy. It goes on to look at the crucial issues that confronted them during the conflict: Truman's decision to commit US forces to war without congressional approval; MacArthur's pressure for an assault on Inchon; and the decision to open truce negotiations.

The book analyzes the ground-level results and long-term consequences of command decisions, and explores the course the war might have taken had certain crucial decisions been taken differently.