The Multinational Force in Beirut, 1982-1984

The performance of the ill-fated multi-national forces deployed to Lebanon in the early eighties was unique in the history of international peacekeeping: analysts agree that no other operation suffered so much to achieve so little.

As one of the few peacekeeping forces conducted outside UN auspices, MNFI was a daring attempt by three, later four, Western powers to exert influence and contain bloodshed in Beirut in the summer of 1982.

By the fall of 1983, MNF had become part of the problem rather than its solution.

The two-year history of the MNF, presented here in essays first delivered at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, demonstrated the hazard of applying military means to political conflicts and offers invaluable lessons for ocnflict management.

The contributors - soldiers, academics, journalists, politicians and diplomats - almost all had direct personal experience in the deployment of the MNF.

Though their viewpoints vary, one consensus to emerge is that ignorance of Lebanese social and religious complexities among decisions-makers in Washington, Paris, Rome, New York and London explains many of the problems. In the end, the MNF was a tragic player with no clear mandate and a thankless task in difficult circumstances.

The book's sections cover historical and theoretical background on the general issue of peacekeeping; military, diplomatic and political views from the four contributing nations; and views of "other interested parties" such as the Israel Defence Force, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Shiites.